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1. INTRODUCTION
Food stores are filled to the brim with groceries, but most of us here
are jobless and therefore have no money to consistently buy very basic
foodstuffs, resulting in us having mostly one meal per day (Josphat
Madyira, 2015).1
For two decades Zimbabwe has suffered a profound political, economic
and social malaise. Although the country was a net exporter of food in
the 1980s and early 1990s, after 2000 it became a net food importer and
a major recipient of food aid.2 These years were also characterized by a
negative GDP growth rate, rising unemployment, increasing poverty,
hyperinflation, mass out-migration and recurrent national food shortages.3 Most households in the country struggled to meet their food needs.
While both rural and urban households were subjected to this turbulent
environment, the challenges for households in the city, particularly the
poor, were acute given the massive job losses resulting from economic
decline, increases in the cost of housing, water, electricity and transportation, and hyperinflation.4 The causes of the crisis have been widely
debated but there is consensus that it reached its nadir in 2008.5 GDP
had contracted by over 40% between 2000 and 2006; annual inflation
increased from two-digit figures in 2000 to 231 million percent in July
2008 and the country’s external debt ballooned to USD6 billion in 2008.6
Life expectancy, which had peaked at 61 years in 1990, fell to around 36
years in 2008. That year, political violence and the accumulation of failed
economic policies contributed to a drop in food production and a halt to
imports, which created a humanitarian emergency that affected millions
of households in Zimbabwe. The country received USD490 million in
humanitarian aid in 2008, while its foreign currency reserves stood at
only USD6 million.
To understand the scope of the food security challenge that confronted
households in Zimbabwe during the crisis, it is necessary to recall the
broader economic and political context created by the country’s Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), the Fast Track Land
Reform Programme (FTLRP) and Operation Murambatsvina (Restore
Order). All of these politically-inspired developments played a role in
undermining urban livelihoods and increasing household food insecurity.7 ESAP laid the foundation for the serious downward trajectory in the
Zimbabwean economy in the late 1990s and 2000s.8 The programme was
introduced in Zimbabwe in 1991 when the country’s post-independence
economic growth was slowing, foreign investment was declining, and
unemployment was increasing. ESAP was meant to revamp the economy,
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encourage investment and reduce the country’s domestic and international debt through a three-pronged strategy of trade liberalization, domestic
deregulation and investment promotion, and fiscal and monetary policies
to curtail state expenditure. In practice, these austerity measures led to the
closure of many factories, large-scale retrenchments, declining real wages,
skyrocketing consumer prices, and a decline in the formal economy.9
Another critical development with direct food security implications was
the launch of the government’s land reform programme in 2000. The
FTLRP aimed to expropriate the country’s white-owned farms and
redistribute them to indigenous black farmers. By the end of 2002, only
600 of 4,500 white farmers were still in the country.10 Although over 1.2
million black farmers benefitted from the FTLRP, national agricultural
production drastically declined as the new occupants lacked the financial resources, inputs, labour, equipment and expertise to produce on
the same scale. As a result, the country quickly changed from being a
net exporter to a net importer of food. Maize production deficits averaged over 500,000 tonnes per annum after 2000. While production levels
improved somewhat in the newly resettled areas after 2004, they did not
offset the losses incurred by the termination of white commercial agriculture. From its inception, the programme greatly increased food insecurity
in the country. In urban areas, the impact was particularly negative as very
little food filtered into towns and cities from the rural areas to feed those
already reeling under the general macro-economic meltdown.
In 2005, the government launched an assault on all forms of urban informality, including the informal food economy. Operation Murambatsvina destroyed backyard houses, vending stalls, flea markets and informal
businesses in many cities.11 Although the motives behind the campaign
are disputed (with some seeing it as a politically-motivated attack on
opposition strongholds in the urban areas), there is no denying that it
caused massive disruption of livelihoods and destruction of urban housing. Many income-generating projects were destroyed and more than
700,000 urbanites lost their homes, jobs and livelihoods. Operation Garikayi, launched in the aftermath of Operation Murambatsvina to construct
houses for some of the affected families, failed to mitigate the negative
impacts as the government had neither the capacity nor the resources to
ensure meaningful reparations. Operation Murambatsvina rearranged
Zimbabwe’s urban landscape and worsened the plight of the urban poor,
increasing their vulnerability to hunger and food insecurity.
The impacts of these policies were exacerbated by serious economic
mismanagement. As one commentator noted: “Ill-conceived macroeconomic policies superimposed on counterproductive trade and industrial
THE RETURN OF FOOD: POVERTY AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY IN ZIMBABWE AFTER THE CRISIS
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policies joined with a crisis and the worst global recession since the 1930s
to hurl Zimbabwe into the recessionary jaws of hyperinflation. The lack
of sound economic policies and the failure to service past debt meant that
access to foreign borrowing was lost.”12 By 2008, the food situation in
Zimbabwe was dire. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies estimated that about 5.1 million of the country’s 11.6
people would have no access to food by the end of that year. The government was constrained from importing food by inadequate funding and
rampant inflation. From April to October 2008, both the government
and humanitarian agencies managed to import a total of only 316,000
metric tonnes of cereals, leaving the cereal harvest deficit for 2008/2009 at
666,000 metric tonnes. Although the government indicated that it would
import 600,000 tonnes of maize from South Africa, only 175,000 metric
tonnes had been imported by the end of August 2008.
For most of 2008, the market was characterized by constant staple food
shortages. The formal food system virtually collapsed and most foodstuffs
could only be accessed on the parallel market. The situation was particularly grave in urban areas where households had to purchase most of their
food. Further aggravating the economic crisis was political uncertainty
resulting from the disputed 2008 election. Harmonized elections for
municipal, parliamentary and presidential positions were held in March
2008, but disputes surrounding the outcome of the presidential election,
and the subsequent run-off poll that was boycotted by the opposition,
created a volatile atmosphere in the country.
The 2008 crisis coincided with the implementation of a baseline household food security survey by AFSUN in low-income areas of 11 Southern
African cities including Harare. Among the 462 households surveyed in
Harare, rates of formal unemployment and food poverty were extremely
high. Almost all were food insecure (96%) and nearly three-quarters
(72%) were severely food insecure.13 Dietary diversity was lower than in
any other city in Southern Africa. Indeed, households in low-income
urban areas in Harare were far worse off in terms of all the food insecurity
and poverty indicators than households in the other 10 Southern African
cities surveyed by AFSUN.
After 2008, Zimbabwe’s political and economic situation stabilized
somewhat. During the eight months following the election run-off, for
example, the ruling party and the opposition negotiated the terms of a
power-sharing agreement. The resulting Government of National Unity
was inaugurated in February 2009 and was to last until 2013. The formation of this coalition government and the abandonment of the Zimbabwean dollar helped to stabilize the economy, arresting the precipitous
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decline in GDP, bringing down inflation, introducing a multi-currency
regime and improving the food supply.14 Between 2009 and 2011, Zimbabwe’s GDP growth averaged 7.3%, making it one of the world’s fastest
growing economies, albeit from a very low base. According to the World
Bank, Zimbabwe experienced an economic rebound after 2009 “and
with the support of record international price levels, exports of minerals
- notably diamonds, platinum, gold, and other products - have injected
new life into the economy.”15 Zimbabwean trade flows rebounded with
exports rising at 39% per year. Imports also rose quickly, averaging 34%
per year from 2009 to 2011, in response to domestic demand. However,
mining accounted for a significant proportion of export growth, constituting 50% of total exports during the period 2010-2012,16 and the growing reliance of the economy on mineral exports, low investor confidence
and limited foreign direct investment have all constrained job creation and
wealth redistribution.
As the economy stabilized, domestic food production increased and shops
restocked with food imported primarily from South Africa. Given the
straitened circumstances of most urban households in 2008, there were
grounds for optimism that post-crisis economic recovery and political stability might exercise a positive impact on urban food security in the country. However, political tensions continue to reduce the state’s effectiveness
in improving the everyday lives of most citizens, and particularly urban
residents who wanted fundamental political reforms and grew increasingly disillusioned with the coalition government.17 The 2013 election
gave the ZANU-PF full control over government but subsequent policies
have led to staple food supply problems, price increases, and vulnerability
to changes in weather.18 At the same time, formal and informal sector
retailers have proliferated in Zimbabwe’s cities and continue to re-shape
urban food networks and consumption patterns.
The central question addressed in this report is whether food security in
Zimbabwe’s urban centres has improved since the height of the crisis. In
other words, are positive macro-economic trends translating into groundlevel improvements in incomes, poverty levels and food security? There
is certainly an argument that little has changed for those at the bottom:
problems of unemployment and low salaries have persisted. Most households face new challenges: the debt burden resulting from the unilateral
conversion of household water, electricity and other municipal charges
to the US dollar, high tariffs charged by local authorities, and the high
costs of health and education services and transportation, which leave residents with little money to purchase food.19 To try to answer this question,
AFSUN conducted a follow-up household food security survey in Harare
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in 2012. The areas of the city surveyed and the survey instrument used
were the same as in 2008, allowing for direct longitudinal comparisons of
continuity and change. This report is structured along the same lines as
the 2008 survey report and makes direct comparisons between the findings at these two points in time.

2. METHODOLOGY
The 2008 and 2012 surveys took place in the same three low-income
neighbourhoods of Harare – Mabvuku, Tafara, and Dzivarasekwa. Mabvuku and Tafara are contiguous neighbourhoods established in the 1950s
to accommodate black rural-to-urban migrant labourers on the eastern
fringes of the city. Mabvuku and Tafara hosted many individuals and
events associated with the anti-colonial movement in the twentieth century, and today the neighbourhood continues to be a centre for political
resistance and activism. Dzivarasekwa was established later but serves a
similar purpose in housing low-income families in high-density settlements. Within each of the selected neighbourhoods, participating households were randomly selected and household heads or their representatives were identified within each of these households for interview. A total
of 351 households (with 1,517 individuals) were interviewed in the three
study areas in 2012, lower than the 462 interviewed in 2008 but sufficient
to make meaningful comparisons (Table 1). Enumerators from the University of Zimbabwe collected data from the households using the standardized AFSUN questionnaire. The questionnaire gathered information
about household demographic characteristics, poverty data, income and
expenditure patterns, household food security, food consumption patterns, and household coping mechanisms.
The mean household size in 2012 was 4.3, significantly lower than the
mean of 5.6 in 2008 (Table 1). The largest household in 2008 had 16
members while the largest household in 2012 had 13. The proportion
of households with 1-5 members increased from 56% in 2008 to 77%
in 2012. On the other hand, the proportion of larger households with
6-10 members fell from 42% in 2008 to 22% in 2012. Extremely small
households with one or two members were more prevalent in the 2012
sample (19%) than in 2008 (5%). Although the reasons for this apparently
dramatic reshaping of household demography are open to speculation, the
data on household type provides a possible clue.
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FIGURE 1: Location of Study Areas in Harare
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TABLE 1: Sample and Household Size
2008
Total number of households sampled

2012

462

351

Total sample population

2,572

1,517

Average household size

5.6

4.3

Median household size

5.0

4.0

Smallest household size

1

1

Largest household size

16

13

The AFSUN survey questionnaire categorized households into four
types based on the gender and relationships of the members. Femalecentred households are headed by a woman without a partner and include
any combination of immediate relatives (including her children, siblings,
parents and grandparents). The proportion of female-centred households
in the 2012 survey (24%) was almost the same as in 2008 (23%) (Table
2). Male-centred households are headed by a man without a partner and
include any combination of immediate relatives (including his children,
siblings, parents and grandparents). The proportion of male-headed
households in 2012 (9%) was also very similar to 2008 (8%) (Table 2).
Nuclear households include a head and a spouse or partner, with or without children, but without other relatives in the household. The proportion of nuclear households in 2012 was 44%, a slight increase from 37%
in the 2008 survey (Table 2). Finally, extended households have a head, a
spouse or partner, immediate relatives and a combination of other memTHE RETURN OF FOOD: POVERTY AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY IN ZIMBABWE AFTER THE CRISIS
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bers (relatives and non-relatives). The proportion of extended households
decreased from 32% in 2008 to 22% in 2012 (Table 2). One reason for
the decline in overall household size therefore appears to be a decline in
the number of extended family units, suggesting that at the height of the
crisis taking in impoverished or destitute relatives may have been a coping
strategy.
TABLE 2: Household Types in Surveyed Population
2008

2012

No.

%

No.

%

104

23

85

24

35

8

32

9

Nuclear

173

37

156

44

Extended

150

32

78

22

Female-centred
Male-centred

3. CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT,
INCOME AND EXPENDITURE
A comparison of the 2008 and 2012 employment profile of household
members suggests little change in the labour market prospects of poor
urban households in Harare. Overall employment was only slightly different in 2012 (59% employed) than it had been in 2008 (58% employed).
Unemployment figures were also very similar (at 42% in 2008 and 40%
in 2012). However, within each sub-category there were clear shifts. First,
among the employed there was a move away from full-time towards parttime employment. The proportion of all working-age adults employed
full-time fell from 43% to 35% between 2008 and 2012 and the proportion employed part-time increased from 15% to 24%. Second, among
the unemployed, a higher proportion were looking for work in 2012
(19%) than in 2008 (15%), which might suggest a perception of improved
employment opportunities or reflect a younger demographic likely to be
more economically active.
TABLE 3: Work Status of Household Members Aged 18-65
2008
No.

2012
%

No.

%

Employed full-time

598

43

300

35

Employed part-time

208

15

207

24

Unemployed and looking for work

203

15

163

19

Unemployed and not looking for work

368

27

176

21

1,377

100

846

100

Total

8
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Cross-checking these figures with other data proved problematical. Official census data does not differentiate between part-time and full-time
employment, for example.20 The 2012 Census, which counts all people
over the age of 14, estimated that 17% of the population of Harare Province were not in the labour force.21 This group included students, economically inactive homemakers, retirees, and people with disabilities. The
group of labour force participants who were unemployed, corresponding
to the AFSUN category of “unemployed and looking for work,” was
14%. The remaining 69% of the adult population included formally and
informally employed workers, piece workers, and seasonal workers. The
Census report does not provide disaggregated statistics for workers in
these vastly different working conditions. Unsurprisingly, the AFSUN
survey in 2012 found much higher unemployment rates and higher rates
of adults not participating in the labour force in low-income settlements
than in the Census data for the provincial population as a whole.
Urban households worldwide reduce their vulnerability by drawing
on multiple types of income sources rather than relying solely on paid
employment.22 Having a wider range of income sources means that if one
source fails, for example through job loss or illness, the household has
other sources to draw on to mitigate the consequences. In the context
of Harare, multiple sources of income were necessary for a household to
survive during the crisis of 2008 when the Zimbabwean dollar was almost
worthless. In 2012, the pattern of multiple household income sources
persisted even as income from wage work became relatively more prevalent. Despite the decline in the overall proportion of household members
in full-time wage work between 2008 and 2012 (Table 3), the proportion
of households receiving income from wage work actually increased from
55% in 2008 to 65% in 2012 (Table 4). And, despite the increase in the
proportion of household members working part time, the proportion of
households receiving income from casual work declined from 32% in
2008 to 24% in 2012 (Table 4).
The proportion of households deriving income from informal sector activity fell from 42% in 2008 to 34% in 2012, which does seem to
indicate a small reduction in the importance of informality, which had
become almost the only way for many households to survive in 2008. At
the same time, the fact that one-third of all households were still obtaining income from informal activity in 2012 indicates that there has not
been a massive decline in the importance of informal income sources for
the urban poor (Table 4). The proportion of households receiving income
from cash remittances was relatively low in 2008 and declined still further
(from 12% to 6%) in 2012. In general, remittances have been shown to be
a critical income source for urban and rural households in Zimbabwe over
THE RETURN OF FOOD: POVERTY AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY IN ZIMBABWE AFTER THE CRISIS
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the last decade.23 At the same time, the numbers of Zimbabweans leaving
the country (and, in turn, remitting) have continued to rise.24 What this
data suggests is that poor urban households in Harare (from these communities at least) are largely excluded from the remitting economy.
The collapse of the Zimbabwean dollar, hyper-inflation, and the failure
of many employers to provide salaries at the height of the crisis made it
very difficult for household heads to estimate the income they received
from each source in 2008. For this reason, the income data in Table 4, and
the changes between 2008 and 2012, need to be treated with caution. In
addition, the mean income from each source needs to be seen in relation
to the percentage of households receiving income from that source; for
example, even though the mean income of USD268 from formal business makes it a relatively lucrative source, only 3% of households received
income this way (Table 4).
TABLE 4: Sources of Household Income and Mean Monthly Income
from Each Source
2008
No.

% of
households

Wage work

253

Informal business

195

Casual work
Remittances

2012
USD

No.

% of
households

USD

55

77

229

65

440

42

155

120

34

105

150

32

95

83

24

138

56

12

92

21

6

145

Rent

41

9

17

39

11

105

Formal business

14

3

268

6

2

227

Pension/disability
allowance/grant

10

2

7

5

1

71

Sale of urban
farm products

8

2

98

8

2

59

Sale of rural farm
products

6

1

73

9

2

344

Gifts

6

1

19

16

5

96

Aid (money)

1

<1

6

0

0

N/A

Despite very high rates of formal sector unemployment, the most significant income source in both 2008 and 2012 was wage work. However, the average monetary value of this income source appears to have
increased nearly sixfold from USD77 per month in 2008 to USD440 per
month in 2012 (Table 4). This change suggests that there might have been
an improvement in household purchasing power, although the value of
income from the second most common income source, informal business, declined from USD155 per month in 2008 to USD105 per month
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in 2012. The declining significance of incomes from informal business
is linked to the reduction of demand in the informal sector as the formal sector improved, police crackdowns on informal vending, and the
decreased profit margins and elimination of the currency blackmarket in
the informal sector.25
To better understand the impact of household income changes on poverty,
it is important to examine concurrent changes in household expenditure.
The proportion of households incurring certain types of expenditure –
including food and groceries, housing, education and medical expenses
– was virtually the same in 2008 and 2012 (Table 5). However, there were
significant changes in other expenditure categories. For example, the
proportion of households spending money on transportation increased
from 36% to 68% and on fuel from 58% to 70%, a clear reflection of the
country’s fuel supply problems in 2008 and the subsequent availability by
2012. There was a decline in the percentage of households purchasing
goods for resale (21% to 8%) consistent with the reduction in formal and
informal business. Few households (4%) reported saving any money in
2008, a figure that increased to 15% in 2012, suggesting slightly greater
disposable income and confidence in the financial system. On the other
hand, the percentage of households incurring expenses on the servicing
or repayment of debt increased threefold, from 3% to 9%, confirmation
of the growing burden of debt facing some low-income households.
TABLE 5: Household Expenditures by Category and Mean Monthly
Amount of Each Expense
2008
No.

2012

% of
households

USD

No.

% of
households

USD

Food and groceries

428

94

57

346

99

91

Housing

413

90

7

308

89

69

Utilities

411

90

3

320

91

46

Fuel

266

58

10

244

70

16

Education

263

58

5

202

58

43

Transportation

164

36

29

238

68

46

Medical expenses

120

26

7

105

30

21

Goods purchased to sell

98

21

136

28

8

158

Funeral costs

42

9

11

38

11

42

Remittances

30

6

13

26

7

22

Savings

20

4

87

51

15

137

Debt service/repayment

15

3

6

32

9

74

Home-based care

11

2

15

11

3

19

7

1

3

34

10

17

Insurance
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A focus on the changes in expenses incurred by each household suggests that life in Harare was far more costly in 2012 than in 2008, even
with higher wage incomes. Expenditure in every category was higher in
2012, especially in housing, education, debt servicing/repayment (around
10 times as much), utilities (over 15 times the cost), and funeral costs
(almost quadruple). Goods purchased to sell were the most costly expenditure item in both surveys (USD136 in 2008 and USD158 in 2012),
dwarfing the incomes earned through informal and formal businesses
and highlighting the financial risk incurred by households engaged in
trading activities. Expenditure on food and groceries increased (but not
as much as the cost of other basic necessities), rising from USD57 per
month to USD91 per month (Table 5). Households are likely to have
benefitted from more stable food prices that allowed them to plan for food
expenses and maintain a tight budget where necessary. The sharp increase
in expenditures on education is cause for concern that young people in
low-income households will increasingly be marginalized from the more
remunerative opportunities in the urban job market, thus reinforcing the
intergenerational cycle of poverty.

4. HOUSEHOLD POVERTY
Income and expenditure data tell only part of the story of urban poverty in Harare in 2008 and 2012. Non-monetary livelihood strategies and
transactions are obscured in these calculations even though they make up
a large part of household economies, especially for the poor. This section
reports on the participants’ experiences of going without basic necessities,
including food, as calculated in the Lived Poverty Index (LPI). The LPI
score for each household is calculated on a scale of 0.0 to 4.0, whereby
0.0 represents the extreme of never going without and 4.0 the opposite
extreme of always going without basic needs, including food to eat; clean
water for home use; medicine or medical treatment; electricity in the
home; fuel to cook food; and a cash income.
The mean LPI in Harare fell from 2.2 in 2008 to 1.6 in 2012. The quartile
distribution of LPI scores shows a significant improvement in lived poverty in 2012, with the proportion of households in the least poor category
increasing from 10% in 2008 to 28% in 2012 (Table 6). The proportion
of households in the second least poor category also increased, from 35%
in 2008 to 48% in 2012. The proportion of households in the lowest two
quartiles correspondingly decreased from 55% in 2008 to 24% in 2012.
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TABLE 6: Lived Poverty Index (LPI) Scores
2008

2012

No.

%

No.

%

0-1 (never to seldom
without)

42

10

96

28

1.01-2.00 (seldom to
sometimes without)

152

35

162

48

2.01-3.00 (sometimes
to often without)

193

45

73

22

43

10

6

2

430

100

337

100

3.01-4.00 (often to
always without)
Total

The breakdown of “basic needs gone without” illustrates the changing
dimensions of household poverty in Harare. Table 7 provides the responses to the questions used to calculate the LPI scores. Access to clean water
and fuel for cooking improved but continued to be widespread problems
in 2012. The proportion of households “many times/always” going without decreased significantly between 2008 and 2012 for clean water (67%
to 37%), electricity (61% to 43%), medicine/medical treatment (40% to
14%) and cooking fuel (32% to 15%). At the same time, the proportion
“never going without” clean water and electricity did not change significantly. The problem of clean water reflects a long-standing infrastructure
deficit in Harare that is similar to many other Southern African cities.26
The problem in Harare is exacerbated by concerns about water safety due
to mismanagement of existing infrastructure and a lack of resources. The
persistent problem with access to electricity is also caused by an infrastructure deficit and is directly related to the political and economic crisis. The
improvement in access to medical treatment is the result of the improved
conditions in 2012 for importing medicine with stable currencies.
The two LPI indicators most relevant to food security are having a cash
income and enough food to eat. With regard to the former there was a clear
improvement between 2008 and 2012. The proportion of households that
“always/many times” went without a cash income declined from 59%
to 31% and the proportion that “never went without” improved from
11% to 20%. Going without a cash income, even occasionally, means
that households rely more on non-monetized livelihood activities, such
as bartering, working for payment in kind, household production of basic
needs (including urban agriculture), and drawing on social capital. In
2012, almost half (49%) of all households had gone without a cash income
once or twice or several times in the previous year. The relative increase in
the proportion of employed people working part-time probably indicates
an increasing casualization of wage labour, with a greater likelihood of
THE RETURN OF FOOD: POVERTY AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY IN ZIMBABWE AFTER THE CRISIS
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intermittent periods without a cash income in the household, even in a
relatively stable macroeconomic context.
The proportion of households that “always/many times” went without
enough food declined from 40% to 20% and the proportion that “never
went without” improved from 19% to 25%. The LPI findings therefore
suggest an overall improvement in incomes and food access although 55%
still went without enough food. Even in the relatively stable economy of
2012, three-quarters of households had experienced food shortages in the
previous year.

TABLE 7: Frequency of Going Without Basic Needs Over the Previous Year
Enough
Clean water
food to
for home
eat (% of
use (% of
households) households)

Medicine
Fuel to
or medical Electricity in
A cash incook food
treatment
home (% of
come (% of
(% of
(% of
households)
households)
households)
households)

2008

2012

2008

2012

2008

2012

2008

2012

2008

2012

2008

2012

Gone without
many times/
always

40

20

67

37

40

14

61

43

32

15

59

31

Gone without
once or twice/
several times

40

55

25

55

37

52

37

52

56

60

30

49

Never gone
without

19

25

8

7

23

34

1

5

12

25

11

20

5. SHIFTING SOURCES OF FOOD
Households in Harare access food from multiple sources, although
patronage of various different types of food outlet shifted significantly
between 2008 and 2012. In 2008, only 30% of households accessed food
at supermarkets, whereas in 2012 the vast majority (92%) did (Figure
2). Increased use of supermarkets as a mainstream food source for the
urban poor is consistent with the stabilization of the formal economy and
the restocking of the empty shelves of 2008. Small shops and takeaways
also increased dramatically in popularity, from being patronized by only
17% of households in 2008 to 73% of households in 2012. The increased
patronage of supermarkets and small shops/takeaways did not appear to
displace other food sources, however, but rather expanded the range of
sources used. Informal markets/street food remained the most popular
source, falling marginally from 97% of households in 2008 to 94% in
2012.
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FIGURE 2: Household Food Sources
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In both 2008 and 2012, supermarkets were most likely to be used on a
monthly basis, in keeping with the frequency of wage and social grant
payments (Figure 3). In contrast, informal markets were most likely to
be used on a daily basis. Small shops/takeaways were also used more frequently than supermarkets, and the most common use pattern shifted
from monthly in 2008 to daily in 2012. Supermarkets are still used less
frequently in part because they are often located in formally planned areas
at some distance from the informal areas surveyed.27 Other advantages
of informal markets and small shops/takeaways are that they are likely to
facilitate price negotiation, offer flexibility in the quantity of food purchased, and provide informal credit arrangements.28
Urban agriculture has been a constant and expanding feature of the urban
landscape in Harare since the early 1990s.29 In recent years, urban agriculture has been associated primarily with low-income households with
inadequate financial resources and insecure livelihood opportunities.30
In both 2008 and 2012, very few households (around 2%) derived any
income from the sale of home-grown produce. However, it has been and
remains an important source of food for home consumption. The 2008
survey found that well over half (60%) of the households were engaged
THE RETURN OF FOOD: POVERTY AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY IN ZIMBABWE AFTER THE CRISIS
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in urban agriculture as a food source (Figure 2). Furthermore, 70% of
households producing their own food accessed it on at least a weekly
basis (Figure 4). In 2012, the proportion of households reporting urban
agriculture as a food source had declined from 60% to 46%, and 59%
of these households used what they produced on at least a weekly basis.
Although still very high by regional standards, urban agriculture appears
to have declined in importance as purchased food has become more available. Another indication of this decline was evident in the responses to
the question: “To what extent does the household rely on field crops and
garden crops as additional livelihood strategies?” In the 2008 survey, 45%
and 47% of households relied to some degree on garden crops and field
crops respectively, whereas in 2012 these figures had fallen to 28% and
23% (Table 8). In other words, the proportion of households using urban
agriculture to supplement food from other sources also fell. The reduction
in the post-2008 importance of urban agriculture is not as sharp as one
would expect if it was merely a short-term response to an acute economic
crisis, however. Indeed, the continued importance of urban agriculture
for many households after 2008 suggests it is an enduring part of urban
lifestyles in Harare rather than a short-term response to unusually difficult
circumstances.
FIGURE 3: Frequency of Patronage of Main Food Sources
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TABLE 8: Reliance on Urban Agricultural Livelihood Activities
Garden crops

Field crops

Livestock

Tree crops

2008

2012

2008

2012

2008

2012

2008

2012

Totally dependent

7

1

10

2

2

0

1

0

Partly dependent

20

11

23

13

3

<1

6

1

Slightly dependent

18

16

14

8

2

2

3

4

Not at all dependent

55

72

53

77

93

97

90

94
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FIGURE 4: Frequency of Sourcing Food from Urban Agriculture
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Food remittances from the countryside have received growing attention in urban food security research as an important non-monetized
food source.31 The proportion of households receiving food remittances
increased slightly from 42% in 2008 to 47% in 2012 (Table 9). Most of
this increase came from the rural areas (37% to 42%). Rural relatives
remained the most important source of food remittances: 63% of recipient
households in 2012, up from 55% in 2008. Although there is considerable
controversy about the impact of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme
on agriculture in Zimbabwe, there is an emerging consensus that resettled
black farmers are producing a great deal more than they used to.32 This
could explain the continued and even increased flow of food remittances
over time. Alternatively, the increase in 2012 may simply have reflected
a better agricultural season in 2012. Other shifts between 2008 and 2012
included inter-urban food transfers with a slight drop in the proportion of
households receiving food from other centres (from 43% to 37%).
Further insight into the changing nature of rural to urban food remittances can be gained through looking at the types of foodstuffs being
remitted in 2008 and 2012. In 2008, the top three foods remitted (in
terms of the proportion of recipient households) were cereals (95%), vegetables (35%), and foods made from beans, peas, lentils or nuts (30%)
(Table 10). In 2012, the top three foods were cereals (80%), foods made
from beans, peas, lentils, or nuts (39%), and fruits (24%). What is most
striking is the decrease in remittances of vegetables (35% to 18%) and the
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simultaneous increase in remittances of fruit (5% to 24%) and roots and
tubers (9% to 23%). The greater variety of foods remitted in 2012 could
be a reflection of improved transportation linkages and better and more
diverse agricultural production. The decline in cereals as a proportion of
types of remittances could be indicative of improved urban maize markets
in 2012. Food remittances continued to be seen as important in 2012,
with half (49%) of remittance-receiving households saying they were very
important or critical to survival, although this figure did drop from 83%
in 2008 (Figure 5).

TABLE 9: Food Remittances from Rural and Urban Areas
2008
Remitters
Rural relatives

No.

2012

% of recipient
households

No.

% of recipient
households

105

55

103

63

Rural friends

19

10

12

7

Urban relatives

92

48

67

41

Urban friends

48

25

61

37

Geographical origin

No.

% of recipient
households

No.

% of recipient
households

Rural areas only

71

37

69

42

Urban areas only

82

43

60

37

Rural and urban areas

39

20

35

21

% of total households

192

42

164

47

Note: multiple response question

TABLE 10: Types of Foods Remitted to Urban Households from
Rural Areas
% of recipient households
Cereals (foods made from grain)
Roots or tubers

2008

2012

95

80

9

23

35

18

Fruits

5

24

Meat, poultry, or offal

6

10

Eggs

2

7

Vegetables

Fresh or dried fish or shellfish

1

8

Foods made from beans, peas, lentils, or nuts

30

39

Cheese, yoghurt, milk, or other milk products

6

4

Foods made with oil, fat, or butter

6

13

Sugar or honey
N

1

9

110

115
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FIGURE 5: Importance of Food Remittances for Households
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6. LEVELS OF FOOD INSECURITY
The AFSUN questionnaire measured food security levels using four
international measurement tools developed by the Food and Nutrition
Technical Assistance Project (FANTA):33
t )PVTFIPME 'PPE *OTFDVSJUZ "DDFTT 4DPSF )'*"4  5IF )'*"4
measures the degree of food insecurity during the month prior to the
survey. An HFIAS score is calculated for each household based on
answers to nine “frequency-of occurrence” questions. The minimum
score is 0 and the maximum is 27. The higher the score, the more
food insecurity the household experienced.
t )PVTFIPME'PPE*OTFDVSJUZ"DDFTT1SFWBMFODF )'*"1 5IF)'*"1
indicator uses the responses to the HFIAS questions to group households into four levels of household food insecurity: food secure, mildly
food insecure, moderately food insecure, and severely food insecure.
t )PVTFIPME%JFUBSZ%JWFSTJUZ4DPSF )%%4 %JFUBSZEJWFSTJUZSFGFST
to how many food groups are consumed within the household in the
previous 24 hours. The maximum number, based on the FAO classification of food groups for Africa, is 12. An increase in the average
number of different food groups consumed provides a quantifiable
measure of improved household food access.
t .POUITPG"EFRVBUF)PVTFIPME'PPE1SPWJTJPOJOH .")'1 5IJT
indicator captures changes in the household’s ability to ensure that
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food is available above a minimum level the year round. Households
are asked to identify in which months (during the past 12) they did
not have access to sufficient food to meet their household needs.
In 2008, these areas of Harare had one of the worst HFIAS scores of all the
low-income neighbourhoods in 11 cities surveyed by AFSUN (a mean of
14.7 and a median of 16.0) (Table 11). Only Manzini in Swaziland (a
country ravaged by HIV and AIDS) had a higher mean (14.9) than Harare
although its median score was lower (14.0). In 2012, both the mean and
median scores in Harare were considerably lower (at 9.6 and 10.0 respectively). Scores like that in 2008 would have made it one of the less food
insecure cities in the region (akin to Windhoek and Maputo but better
than cities such as Gaborone, Lusaka and Cape Town).
TABLE 11: HFIAS Results in AFSUN Surveys
No. of households

Mean

Median

Harare (2012)

342

9.6

10.0

Harare (2008)

454

14.7

16.0

Windhoek

442

9.3

9.0

Gaborone

391

10.8

11.0

Maseru

795

12.8

13.0

Manzini

489

14.9

14.0

Maputo

389

10.4

10.0

Blantyre

431

5.3

4.0

Lusaka

386

11.5

11.0

Cape Town

1,026

10.7

11.0

Msunduzi

548

11.3

11.0

Johannesburg

976

4.7

1.5

The HFIAP scores provide further insight into the absolute and relative
improvement in food security status in Harare between 2008 and 2012. In
2008, Harare had the lowest number of food secure households (2%) and
the second highest number of severely food insecure households (72%). In
2012, the share of food secure households had increased to 10%; the share
of mildly food insecure households increased from 3% to 7%; the share
of moderately food insecure households decreased from 24% to 20%;
and the proportion of severely food insecure households fell from 72%
to 63% (Figure 6). Even with the drop in the mean and median HFIAS
scores, the share of severely food insecure households remained alarmingly high in 2012. The discrepancy in the picture presented by changes
in the HFIAS as opposed to the more incremental HFIAP redistribution
is consistent with an argument that food security gains were accrued to
a small group of households that benefitted from economic stabilization.

20

AFRICAN FOOD SECURITY URBAN NETWORK (AFSUN)

FIGURE 6: Distribution of Households in HFIAP Categories
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Aggregate household dietary diversity also appears to have improved
between 2008 and 2012. The HDDS rose from a mean score of 4.8 in
2008 to 6.5 in 2012. The median score improved from 5 in 2008 to 6 in
2012. A comparison of the distribution of HDDS scores at the two points
in time shows a significant fall in the number of households with scores
of 1-5 (Figure 7). Whereas nearly one-third (29%) of households in 2008
were in the extremely low range of 1-3, only 9% were in this category
in 2012. Many more households were also at the high end of the scale in
2012, with 30% of households consuming foods from at least eight food
groups on the day prior to the survey compared to only 12% in 2008.
The improvement in dietary diversity is reflected in the more widespread
consumption of foods from almost every food group (Table 12). The only
food group consumed by a lower proportion of households in 2012 than
in 2008 was vegetables (consumed by 92% of households in 2008 and by
83% of households in 2012). The most substantial increases were in the
consumption of dairy products (12% in 2008 and 39% in 2012), meat
(22% in 2008 and 50% in 2012), fruits (15% in 2008 and 41% in 2012),
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able exception of increased fruit consumption, the foods with the sharpest increases conform to a more typical urban diet associated with the
dietary transition taking place throughout the Global South.34 Even as
food becomes more abundant and accessible, the increased consumption
of fatty, calorie-dense, and processed foods could be putting Harare on a
more general path with negative impacts on health in the long term.
FIGURE 7: Distribution of Household Dietary Diversity Scores
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TABLE 12: Food Groups Consumed in Prior 24 Hours
2008
No.
Cereals (foods made from grain)
Roots or tubers
Vegetables
Fruits
Meat, poultry, or offal

2012
%

No.

%

455

99

344

98

57

12

109

31

423

92

293

83

70

15

142

41

103

22

176

50

Eggs

40

9

75

21

Fresh or dried fish or shellfish

81

18

64

18

Foods made from beans, peas, lentils, or nuts

84

18

87

25

Cheese, yoghurt, milk, or other milk products

54

12

138

39

Foods made with oil, fat, or butter

261

56

255

73

Sugar or honey

295

64

292

83

Other foods

284

62

295

84

11

12
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The fourth measurement tool for assessing household food security was
the MAHFP. Fewer households experienced many months of inadequate
food provisioning in the 2012 survey than in 2008 (Figure 8).

% households with inadequate provisioning

FIGURE 8: Distribution of MAHFP Scores
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In 2008, September was the leanest month, during which three-quarters
of households had inadequate food (Figure 9). November and December
were the best months in the 2008 survey. In the 2012 survey, however,
January was the most likely month for inadequate food provisioning and
December was the least common month.
FIGURE 9: Proportion of Households with Inadequate Food
Provisioning by Month
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The marked change in seasonal pattern can partly be explained by the fact
that in 2008, households were far more sensitive to the agricultural cycle
where June-October is the dry season when little food is harvested. With
people relying heavily on remittances and urban agriculture in 2008, it
stands to reason that the harvest cycle contributed to September being the
leanest month. The greater availability of food for purchase in 2012 meant
that households were more able to smooth their consumption in the lean
agricultural season. In addition, the emergence of January as the month
with greatest food inadequacy is a reflection of a shift back to a longstanding pattern of overspending and overconsumption during December
festivities.

7. DETERMINANTS OF VARIABILITY
IN FOOD SECURITY
While many factors contribute to food access, rapid price increases such
as those experienced during the extraordinarily high inflation of 2008
force consumers to cut back on purchases, reduce food consumption, sacrifice nutritional value for sustenance, and make trade-offs between food
and other basic needs. Respondents in both 2008 and 2012 were asked
whether the household had gone without certain types of food because
of prices over the previous six months. In 2008, a third of households
(32%) experienced daily shortages due to food price increases (Figure
10). More than two-thirds experienced going without food on at least a
weekly basis and only 4% never went without food. In 2012, the proportion experiencing daily shortages had declined from 32% to only 4%. On
the other hand, the proportion of households that had never experienced
shortages increased even more dramatically from 4% in 2008 to 51% in
2012 (Figure 10).
In 2008, the most common foods that people went without due to price
increases were dairy products (84%), eggs (83%), meats, poultry, or offal
(79%), and roots or tubers (78%) (Figure 11). These food types tend to be
rich in protein, fats, and micronutrients, and omitting them from the diet
on a consistent basis could have long-term health consequences, especially for children. Few households went without vegetables because of
price increases, probably reflecting the importance of urban horticulture
and the consistent availability of vegetables in the city. In 2012, those
households that went without food due to price increases went without
meat, poultry, or offal (83%), cereals (52%) and dairy products (54%).
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FIGURE 10: Frequency of Going Without Food Due to Price Increases
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FIGURE 11: Types of Foods Not Consumed Due to Price Increases
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Most of the analysis in this report has dealt with households in the aggregate. However, by cross-tabulating household characteristics with mean
food security scores, it is possible to determine which types of households were more or less food secure and how this changed between 2008
and 2012. Table 13 shows that there was an overall improvement in food
security scores among all household size groups. However, the magnitude
of the improvement did differ: for example, households with 1-5 memTHE RETURN OF FOOD: POVERTY AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY IN ZIMBABWE AFTER THE CRISIS
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bers reduced their mean HFIAS by 4.7 and improved their HDDS and
MAHFP by 1.7. The equivalent improvements for households with 6-10
members were 5.6 (HFIAS), 1.7 (HDDS) and 1.5 (MAHFP). In 2012 as
in 2008, households with fewer members had lower HFIAS scores. The
difference in mean HFIAS scores between households with 1-5 members
and those with 6-10 members was therefore less in 2012 (0.9) than in
2008 (1.8), suggesting that additional household members were less challenging to feed in 2012.
The mean HDDS score for households with 1-5 members was higher
than for households with 6-10 members by a consistent difference of
0.3. There was no difference in MAHFP scores for these two groups in
2008, but in 2012 smaller households had a slightly better MAHFP score
(9.0) than medium-sized households (8.8) (Table 13). In all food insecurity scores, very large households consistently scored worse than smaller
households, a reflection of the higher dependency ratios.

TABLE 13: Mean Food Insecurity Scores by Household Size, Type
and LPI Score
Household size

HFIAS

HDDS

MAHFP

2008

2012

2008

2012

2008

2012

1-5

13.9

9.2

4.9

6.6

7.3

9.0

6-10

15.7

10.1

4.6

6.3

7.3

8.8

>10

17.7

14.8

4.0

4.2

5.0

7.0

2008

2012

2008

2012

2008

2012

Female-centred

16.1

10.5

4.3

6.2

6.6

8.8

Male-centred

14.4

9.1

5.1

5.6

7.5

9.6

Nuclear

14.3

9.1

4.8

6.6

7.3

9.0

Extended

14.4

9.4

4.9

6.9

7.6

Household type

LPI score

HFIAS

HDDS

HFIAS

MAHFP

HDDS

8.8
MAHFP

2008

2012

2008

2012

2008

2012

0.00-1.00

8.5

4.5

6.2

7.6

9.3

10.7

1.01-2.00

12.5

10.1

5.3

6.1

8.2

8.9

2.01-3.00

17.1

14.1

4.2

5.7

6.4

6.6

3.01-4.00

18.9

16.0

4.0

4.8

6.1

9.5

In 2008, and in 2012, female-centred households were the least food
secure type of household. There was a smaller gap between the HFIAS of
nuclear and female-centred households in 2012 (1.4) than in 2008 (1.8),
suggesting a relatively greater improvement for female-centred households (Table 13). The difference between female-centred and extended
households closed even more, from 1.7 in 2008 to 1.1 in 2012, reflecting a
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worse position for extended households relative to other household types
in 2012. The relatively worse position for extended households, which by
definition have more members, seems to contradict the observation that
being a household with more members was relatively less detrimental to
household food security status in 2012. Nonetheless, it bears noting that
many female-centred and nuclear households also have more than five
members.
Female-centred households improved slightly more relative to nuclear
households in terms of the HDDS, with a difference of 0.5 in 2008 and
0.4 in 2012 (Table 13). Male-centred households improved the least in
terms of HDDS, falling from the highest mean score in 2008 to the lowest mean score in 2012 among household types. Male-centred households
are the least common type and it is therefore difficult to generalize from
these small numbers, but it is reasonable to expect that single men prepare
for themselves a narrower set of meals, or possibly eat more at restaurants
with a narrow selection of foods. Extended households had the highest
mean HDDS in 2012 (Table 13). The difference in MAHFP scores among
household types in 2012 was less than in 2008, with female-centred and
male-centred households improving their scores relative to nuclear and
extended households. Extended households improved the least in terms
of MAHFP (difference of 1.2), while female-centred households showed
the most improvement (difference of 2.2). Household type is intertwined
with issues of gender and poverty and the relatively high food insecurity
scores for female-centred households in 2008 and 2012 reflect the link
between gender and poverty in Southern African cities. The closing of
the food security gap between female-centred and other household types
suggests that single women with dependants were more severely affected
than men and married women by the economic crisis.
Lower LPI scores were correlated with better food security scores in both
surveys and by all measures of food security status. The single exception
was the higher MAHFP score in 2012 for households with an LPI score
of 3.01-4.00 than for households with LPI scores of 2.01-3.00 (Table 13).
This was an anomaly due to the extremely small number of households
with LPI scores above 3.01 in 2012 (only 2% of households surveyed).
There was a wider difference in the mean HFIAS of the least poor and the
second least poor group in 2012 (5.6) than in 2008 (4.0), and less of a difference between the two middle groups in 2012 (4.0) than in 2008 (4.6).
HDDS was also relatively much better for the least poor households than
the second least poor households in 2012 than in 2008 (difference of 1.5
rather than 0.9). The gap in HDDS between households with LPI scores
of 1.01-2.00 and households with LPI scores of 2.01-3.00 was less in 2012
(0.4) than in 2008 (1.1).
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Cross-tabulating the food insecurity scores with the use of selected food
sources by the households revealed further trends. In 2008, households
that received food remittances from the rural areas had a lower mean
HFIAS (13.6) than households that did not receive these remittances
(14.8) (Table 14). In 2012, the opposite was true and households that
received remittances had a higher mean HFIAS (10.1) than households
that did not (9.7). This finding is consistent with the “importance of
remittances for survival” finding (Figure 5), with remittances evidently
playing a more important role in reducing the food insecurity of households that received them in 2008. There was little change in the relative
difference in HDDS or MAHFP between these groups of households in
2008 and 2012 (Table 14).
TABLE 14: Mean Food Insecurity Scores by Selected Food Sources
HFIAS

HDDS

MAHFP

Food from rural
remittances?

2008

2012

2008

2012

2008

2012

Yes

13.6

10.1

5.2

6.8

7.5

9.2

No

14.8

9.7

4.7

6.4

7.2

HFIAS

HDDS

8.9
MAHFP

Food from urban
agriculture?

2008

2012

2008

2012

2008

2012

Yes

14.8

9.3

4.7

6.5

7.3

8.9

No

14.2

10.1

4.8

6.4

7.1

9.0

The opposite trend appeared in cross-tabulations of household food insecurity indicators with households that grew some of their own food and
those that did not. In 2008, households that reported growing their own
food as a food source had a mean HFIAS of 14.8, which was higher than
the mean HFIAS among households that never produced their own food
(14.2) (Table 14). In 2012, this relationship was inverted and the households that did not produce any of their own food had a higher HFIAS
(10.1) than those that produced some of their own food (9.3). One possible
explanation for this trend is that many vulnerable households that do not
normally produce their own food and, as a result, lack the necessary tools,
inputs, and knowledge of agriculture, were engaging in subsistence food
production during the crisis. The proportion of households engaging in
urban agriculture in 2008 suggests that many vulnerable households were
turning to this source as a coping mechanism, temporarily raising the
food insecurity score for households engaged in urban agriculture relative
to other households. The relatively positive score for households engaged
in urban agriculture in 2012 suggests that these are households that normally produce their own food, not only in times of acute crisis. For these
households, urban agriculture appears to have a positive impact on their
food security status. As with rural remittances, there were negligible dif-
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ferences in the HDDS and MAHFP scores between these categories of
households.
The cross-tabulation of household food insecurity scores with income
terciles shows a remarkable consistency in the differences by group in 2008
and 2012 for all food insecurity scores (Table 15). The strong correlation
between income level and food security status is consistent with other
AFSUN surveys.35 The type of income is also shown to have a significant
impact on the food security scores, and the gap in HFIAS between households with a wage income source and without a wage income source widened from 0.4 in 2008 to 2.8 in 2012 (Table 15). The gap in terms of
HDDS (from 0.2 in 2008 to 0.7 in 2012) and MAHFP (from 0.1 to 1.6)
also widened, as households with a wage income benefitted much more
from improvements in food security than households without a wage
income. These findings provide further evidence to the observation that
improvements in household food security in 2012 relative to 2008 were
much greater for a small group of people. The economies of households
receiving a wage income are more directly connected to the formal food
economy, and policies directed at currency stabilization, food price stabilization through food imports, and the development of supermarkets are
more likely to benefit this group.

TABLE 15: Mean Food Insecurity Scores by Income Level and
Income from Wages
Income

HFIAS

HDDS

MAHFP

2008

2012

2008

2012

2008

2012

Lowest income

16.9

12.9

3.9

5.5

6.5

7.3

Middle income

14.2

10.1

4.8

6.3

7.3

8.9

Highest income

13.3

7.2

5.3

7.3

7.7

HFIAS

Income from
wage work?

2008

Yes
No

HDDS

10.2
MAHFP

2012

2008

2012

2008

2012

14.4

8.7

4.9

6.7

7.3

9.5

14.8

11.5

4.7

6.0

7.2

7.9

8. CONCLUSION
The status of household food security in low-income neighbourhoods
in Harare improved in 2012 relative to 2008, and yet persistently high
rates of severe food insecurity demonstrate that the daily need to access
adequate food continued to be a major challenge for most households.
The stabilization of the formal economy by 2012 shaped household food
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access in some key ways: more households received income from wage
work, wage income was higher, and supermarkets and small shops were
much more important food sources than they were in 2008 (although
alternative food sources remained important). Most households continued to rely on a diverse set of livelihood and food security strategies even
under these improved economic conditions, drawing on non-monetary
informal food sources such as rural remittances and urban agriculture in
consistently high numbers. Food price increases were less of a problem in
2012 than in 2008, but they continued to impede many households from
accessing food on a regular basis.
The findings reported here suggest that improvements in food security
status have accrued mostly to the least poor households. More households
fell into the least poor category in 2012, suggesting a combination of two
scenarios: households becoming less poor while also becoming less food
insecure, and households that were already in the least poor category in
2008 that had higher food security scores in 2012. Because the survey did
not track the same households, these trends represent a general widening
of the food security gap in keeping with a widening poverty gap in lowincome urban communities.
Many more households were in the least poor category in 2012, which
appears to be the main factor that led them to be more food secure. The
poorest categories of households were less food insecure in 2012 than in
2008, but they were more food insecure relative to the least poor households. These trends show that food security status in Harare is inextricably linked to other dimensions of poverty and that, even within lowincome neighbourhoods, there is a wide differentiation in poverty rates
and food security status among households. The key lesson for policymakers is that even in the context of overall economic improvement, food
insecurity remains endemic among the poorest segments of the urban
population. Households are already accustomed to drawing on resources
outside of the formal economy and improvements in employment income
have not reversed that trend. These alternative livelihood strategies should
therefore be considered as a normal part of urban life and supported with
state resources that can improve access to food for the most marginalized
groups and ensure the environmental sustainability of activities such as
urban agriculture.
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THE RETURN OF FOOD:
POVERTY AND URBAN
FOOD SECURITY IN
ZIMBABWE AFTER THE CRISIS
The nadir of Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis in 2008 coincided with the implementation of a baseline household food security
survey in Harare by AFSUN. This survey found that households in lowincome urban areas in Zimbabwe’s capital were far worse off in terms
of all the food insecurity and poverty indicators than households in the
other 10 Southern African cities surveyed by AFSUN. The central question addressed in this report is whether food security in Zimbabwe’s
urban centres has improved. AFSUN conducted a follow-up survey in
2012 that allows for direct longitudinal comparisons of continuity and
change. The status of household food security in low-income neighbourhoods in Harare was improved in 2012 relative to 2008, and yet
persistently high rates of severe food insecurity demonstrate that the
daily need to access adequate food continued to be a major challenge.
The key lesson for policymakers is that even in the context of overall
economic improvement, food insecurity remains endemic among the
poorest segments of the urban population. Households are already
accustomed to drawing on resources outside of the formal economy
and improvements in employment income have not reversed that trend.
These alternative livelihood strategies should therefore be considered
as a normal part of urban life and supported with state resources that
can improve access to food for the most marginalized groups.
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